Can the United States learn the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan? There are many obstacles to strategic learning, but examining the ways learning fails in these cases suggests the perspectives and reforms that can improve U.S. policymaking moving forward.
The U.S. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service used communication theory to make predictions about the knowledge and decisions of leaders behind Nazi propaganda broadcasts—something we could do more of today.
Part two of a two-part essay examines airpower theory in practice after World War II, and what the U.S. Air Force’s experiences mean for strategies derived from particular service outlooks or technological specialists.
Part one of a two-part essay recasts the origins of airpower theory as a valid if failed reaction to the economic and moral imperatives of the period between the 20th Century’s two world wars, with lessons relevant to our current interwar moment.
New Marshall Plans have become a recommended cure for everything from poverty at home to violent extremism abroad. Benn Steil's comprehensive history of the Plan, along with a final chapter on contemporary European security, helps readers see through these flimsy rhetorical analogies.
Edward Lansdale, the subject of a new biography from Max Boot, is an oxymoronic type in the history of military innovation, the inside outsider. His experience begs an important question: can the U.S. military make room for weirdos?
Whether working in concert or at cross purposes, successive presidential administrations, Congress, and DoD have conspired to strip the “common” out of the Constitution’s charge to provide for the common defense.